After Wildberries, Is Ozon Next? Russian E-commerce Warehouses Under Repeated Attacks, Sellers Flee to Third-Party Warehouses for Safety

[Ebrun Original] "We will crush Wildberries, and then we will destroy Ozon." These words, spoken by Denys Shtyleman, co-founder of Ukrainian defense tech firm Fire Point, in an interview, are widely seen as a signal of Ukraine's intent to continue attacking Russian e-commerce infrastructure. It marks the first time both platforms have been explicitly named as targets. Fire Point is a rapidly rising military-industrial giant in Ukraine, known for its expansion since 2022 into a key manufacturer of drones and missiles, particularly influential in long-range strikes. While the statement may be hyperbolic, it is not an empty threat. Shortly before his remarks, attacks on Russian e-commerce infrastructure had already erupted across the country, escalating in intensity. The first to bear the brunt was Wildberries, Russia's largest e-commerce platform by market share.

1. Six Rounds of Strikes, Multiple Locations: Wildberries May Have Paralyzed Up to 10% of Its Warehouse Network

Starting July 18, Wildberries' warehouse network faced continuous attacks. The first strikes hit two logistics facilities simultaneously: Elektrostal in the Moscow region and Kotovsk in the Tambov region. The attack scope quickly expanded, affecting warehouses in Koledino (Moscow region), Krasnodar, Nevinnomyssk, the Leningrad region, Ryazan, and Volgograd. By various estimates, Wildberries endured at least six rounds of strikes in late July alone, impacting over a dozen logistics nodes. According to industry insiders, the total damaged area has reached 552,000 square meters, roughly 10% of the company's overall logistics network.

Kyiv's official reason for the attacks on Wildberries is that the platform sells military goods. Ukraine also states these actions are responses to Russian strikes on Ukrainian warehouses and part of a broader strategy to weaken Russia's economic and fiscal capacity. Analysts note that the direct impact of warehouse attacks falls first on the e-commerce platforms themselves, especially suppliers and end-consumer experience, aligning with Ukraine's stated goal: "We need Russians to feel that war is happening and increasingly affecting their lives." Thus, drone strikes on Russian e-commerce platforms are likely to escalate, becoming a "normal option" for Ukraine to pressure Russian society.

Notably, differences in warehouse network structures between the two platforms may have influenced Ukraine's tactical choices. Industry experts previously analyzed that Ozon remained unscathed largely because Wildberries relies on centralized, giant hub warehouses, which are large and concentrated targets. In contrast, Ozon's network consists of more dispersed, medium-to-small regional warehouses, differing in strike value and difficulty. However, with Ukrainian defense firms explicitly threatening continued strikes, the likelihood of Ozon escaping unscathed is rapidly diminishing. In fact, according to Russian social media, an Ozon warehouse in the Utkina Zavod industrial area reportedly caught fire due to an air strike. On the night of July 31, Ukraine targeted Ozon's large distribution centers and hubs in the Volgograd region and Tatarstan—the first publicly reported drone attacks on Ozon logistics centers. Regarding the results, Ozon insists its warehouses were undamaged, only conducting preventive evacuations due to air raid alerts to avoid casualties.

2. Ozon Enters "Pre-Attack" Phase: Modifying Warehouses, Increasing Insurance, Liability Exemptions

Despite no major losses yet, Ozon clearly feels the heightened risk and has taken precautionary measures. In its latest IFRS report, Ozon explicitly lists potential damage to infrastructure components from external influences as an operational risk and says it is taking comprehensive measures to minimize such risks. Ozon states such events could lead to local operational disruptions, asset losses, additional expenses, or even fixed asset impairments, materially impacting its business. Management is advancing risk-minimization plans based on risk characteristics, available technologies, and applicable regulations.

In concrete terms, a photo circulating on social media, allegedly taken at Ozon's Nizhny Novgorod logistics center, shows a giant Russian slogan painted on the roof: "This is not Wildberries, please fly away." However, Ozon has not commented, and the photo's authenticity remains unverified.

Meanwhile, Ozon is significantly raising insurance premiums to spread risk. It has agreed with insurer Ingosstrakh to increase logistics cargo insurance rates by 3.3 times, from 0.0035% to 0.0115% of daily stored inventory value. The new rates take effect July 28 for new customers; existing policyholders and those reinstating after a lapse can use old rates until August 26, with a full switch on August 27. Ozon emphasizes that coverage scope, payout rules, and amounts remain unchanged, covering the full chain: warehouse storage, sorting, transportation, pickup point operations, and returns.

Notably, before increasing insurance, Ozon had already updated its platform service agreement's compensation clause. The new seller agreement, effective June 12, explicitly states: losses due to war, military actions, drone strikes, shelling, national emergencies, mass riots, etc., are borne by the seller as operational risks, with the platform not liable. This adjustment was disclosed by Ozon media in June but gained wide attention only after the July 18 Wildberries warehouse attack. Similarly, Wildberries' new rules, effective July 7, also classify drone strikes as "force majeure." Just 11 days later, on July 18, attacks occurred, and the new clause was applied to goods already stored in platform warehouses. Unlike Wildberries, Ozon has not yet announced additional voluntary compensation plans for war risks.

3. Heavy Losses, Paltry Compensation: Aftermath Dissatisfies

According to Russian Forbes (July 21), the first two Ukrainian attacks alone caused at least $1.87 billion in merchant goods losses. Data Insight's estimates are even starker: for the Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk warehouses alone, if fully stocked at the time, losses could reach 100-120 billion rubles (approximately $1.28-1.54 billion at July 2026 exchange rates). Many sellers are anxiously awaiting compensation while facing severe cash flow pressure. The core dispute is that both platforms have amended seller agreements, leaving most sellers without the right to full compensation for lost goods.

On July 24, Wildberries announced its first round of compensation, primarily covering sellers with goods damaged on July 18 at the Elektrostal warehouse, involving about 88,000 seller accounts. Eligible sellers can view compensation amounts on the backend, with the earliest withdrawal on August 10, and the platform promises payment to bank accounts by August 19. At the end of July, Wildberries released a second support payment, covering 97,000 merchant accounts. Wildberries says it will pay compensation in batches. A company spokesperson emphasized: "Even sellers with minimal inventory received first payments—this was how the company supported as many affected businesses as possible in the first phase." The initial payments are roughly 10-15% of the revenue sellers would have earned from selling all inventory. The company also noted these are voluntary payments—legally, the company had no obligation to pay.

For medium-to-large sellers, Wildberries did not directly compensate based on inventory value but introduced a mechanism called "Sales Simulator" (симулятор продаж). This tool analyzes historical sales prices, sales velocity, and sales cycle performance to estimate potential revenue if goods had not been destroyed, calculating compensation accordingly. However, this plan has sparked strong seller backlash. Some merchants point out that purchase costs are not reflected in sales projections; future growth potential for high-volume products is hard to capture; and the platform simulates "expected sales," not actual inventory value. Dissatisfied sellers complain that actual compensation is only 3-50% of lost goods' value. They voice grievances on Russian social media, citing cases: goods worth 40,000 rubles received 2,600 rubles in compensation; 130,000 rubles goods got 2,900 rubles; 140,000 rubles goods got 13,000 rubles. Many sellers report receiving no compensation at all.

On the other hand, Wildberries offers several "non-compensation" merchant support measures to ease burdens: discounts on 45-day storage fees for new goods at some warehouses, free transfers to regional warehouses, up to 6-month debt deferrals and preferential loans from WB Bank for SMEs, and waiving Russian domestic payment fees.

4. Logistics and Insurance Under Dual Pressure: Systemic Shock to Russian E-commerce Ecosystem

After massive inventory destruction, businesses turned to the government for help. The Russian Association of E-Commerce Market Participants and the Internet Trade Union jointly submitted formal requests to the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Tax Service, asking for a 6-month deferral on tax and social insurance payments for affected enterprises. Some parliamentary factions further demanded the government order Wildberries to create a unified list of affected sellers to reduce their reporting burdens. However, most requests have been ignored or met with template responses. To date, the Russian government has not introduced any unified tax relief plan.

Meanwhile, deeper crises in the insurance and logistics infrastructure are emerging. This series of explosions exposes a long-standing flaw in Russian e-commerce: its logistics cost calculations never accounted for war spillover risks. Traditional commercial insurance covering logistics centers proved almost useless in practice—ordinary insurers typically exclude war and drone strikes from coverage. Compounding the problem, the traditional reinsurance market lacks capacity for such massive losses. Russian insurers lack sufficient reserves to cover tens of billions of rubles in losses, while foreign reinsurers have long stopped underwriting any Russia-related risks.

On the logistics front, damaged warehouse networks in wartime are difficult to repair quickly. Industry insiders note that rebuilding equivalent facilities would take at least 1.5 years, with design approvals and regulatory procedures alone consuming significant time. More critically, with logistics facility strikes now a "clear strategy" from Ukraine, investors and construction groups are likely to wait and shelve new plans. This will worsen the capacity and space shortage, creating a vicious cycle that further undermines the entire e-commerce industry's operational foundation.

5. Russian Sellers' "Great Escape": Fleeing Official Warehouses, Adopting FBS Model, Preserving Core Strength

According to Ebrun, the attacks on platform official warehouses have also affected many Chinese sellers operating local stores. "I thought one attack would be it, but it was just the appetizer; there were several more days of bombings," a Russian seller said helplessly, estimating over 5,000 of their items were damaged in the strikes. Exact losses remain unconfirmed, with constant backend refreshes awaiting official notifications, while platform compensation details change almost daily. "Remaining inventory can last a while; cross-regional transfers can at least keep hot-selling links alive, but who knows what the next few months will bring? In future, I'll only prepare small batches, multiple times, spread across many warehouses," they said. "As for the goods lost in attacked warehouses, I'll salvage what I can. I'm not optimistic; my priority now is preserving core strength."

Many Russian sellers' primary task is to quickly move undamaged goods from both platforms' official warehouses to third-party overseas warehouses. "The only way is to switch from official fulfillment to FBS (Fulfillment by Seller) mode. Third-party warehouses are smaller targets and less likely to be attacked," explained a seller. Amid this "seller exodus," many Russian overseas warehouse service providers have become active. One provider reports a surge in transfer inquiries over the past two weeks, with many existing customers consolidating goods from official warehouses into third-party warehouses. Warehouses in western Russia are seeing increased inbound volumes, mostly from "refugee" platform sellers. Some overseas warehouses are even proactively offering "war risk insurance," promising full compensation for goods damaged during attacks.

Meanwhile, seller dissatisfaction with platforms' aftercare measures is growing. "Russian mainstream platforms charge exorbitant commissions—up to 40-50% for local stores—and official fulfillment fees are not cheap. With such high cuts but no coverage for goods damage, isn't this just taking without giving?" one seller asked bluntly, saying the platforms' current "safety nets" have severely shaken their confidence in long-term commitment to the Russian market. "Other major platforms in Europe and the US generally charge 15-20% commissions. Russia's are abnormally high, yet seller protections are so weak. If these fundamental security issues aren't resolved, we might consider shifting to other emerging markets in the second half of the year," they admitted.

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